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Abstract 
Digital forensics procedures should be developed to obtain digital evidence with regard to legal requirements 
such as admissibility, authenticity, completeness, reliability and believability. On the other hand, Trojan banking 
malware incident has grown significantly and creates a great threat to online banking users globally. This type 
of malware is known to use anti-forensic technique to avoid forensic detection. Moreover, there are numerous 
works and researches that impose the drawbacks on post-mortem forensics approach in dealing with evidence 
that only resided on non-persistence memory or non-volatile memory. There are works that reveal the 
disadvantage of live-response approach on incident response that might compromise the evidence as well.  For 
the last four years, there is notably developed on memory forensics approach that focusing on malware 
incidents. This paper demonstrates the procedures that use three different forensics approaches on three 
different Trojan banking malware samples: Cridex, ZeuS and SpyEye. The aim of this work is to obtain the 
proper forensics approach on Trojan banking malware incidents. The paper also uses a network forensics 
approach to gather and analyse the network-based evidence. 
 
Keywords 
Digital Evidence, Host-Based Evidence, Network Based Evidence, Post-Mortem Forensics, Memory Forensics, 
Windows Registry Forensics, Trojan banking Malwares 
INTRODUCTION 
Rowlingson (2004) shows digital evidence is required whenever it can be used to support a legal process.  Every 
digital forensic examiner should consider the legal requirements of digital evidence that consists of admissibility, 
authenticity, completeness, reliability, and believable (Group, 2002).  The examiner is looking at an object that 
has been designed by people to obtain the digital evidence that might fulfill those requirements when analysing 
digital data. Furthermore, the storage systems of most digital devices have been designed to be scalable and 
flexible, and that have a layered design.  Carrier (2005) shows the different analysis area with figure below: 
 
Figure 1: Layers of analysis based on the design of digital data (Carrier, 2005) 
This different analysis area creates a multiplicity of subject matter such as computer forensics, database 
forensics, memory forensics, Windows registry forensics and network forensics.  Computer forensics or known 
as post-mortem forensics involve shutting a computer down to inspect the disks. However, this process breaks 
network connections and unmounts encrypted disks, resulting in a loss of information and disabling critical 
processes. Live forensic tools can partially overcome these problems by inspecting active systems (Chan, 
Chaugule, Larson, & Campbell, 2010).  Garcia (2007) reveals that traditional forensic approach, which is, 
relying in either virtual memory scanning or persistent data, is not sufficient. Subversion techniques such as 
shadow walker clearly illustrate the need for memory scanners tools aware of malware hiding techniques.  
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Waits, Akinyele, Nolan, and Rogers (2008) documented three significant setbacks on live response. First, it may 
rely on Windows API tools. Therefore if the examiner collects the evidence based on compromised sources 
without they are suspecting it, then this condition could damage the credibility of the evidence in a court of law.  
Second, the live response is not repeatable and third, the examiners cannot ask new questions later. On the other 
hand, there is a significantly growing on memory forensics for the last four years.  The progress of this field is 
forced by the need from digital forensic community in dealing with the outgrowth of malicious software such as 
Trojan banking malwares. 
McAfee and Guardian Analytics performed a study on Operation High Roller on 2012 and uncovered a highly 
sophisticated, global financial services fraud.  The study found 60 servers processing thousands of attempted 
thefts from high-value commercial accounts and some high net worth individuals. Three distinct attack strategies 
have emerged as the targets have expanded from the European Union, to Latin America, to the United States. 
Debunking the popular wisdom that only big banks are affected, the research document attacks every class of 
financial institution: credit union, large global bank, and regional bank. The study estimates the criminals have 
attempted at least €60 million (US$78 million) in fraudulent transfers from accounts at 60 or more financial 
institutions (FIs). If all of the attempted fraud campaigns were as successful the total attempted fraud could be as 
high as €2 billion.  Trojan banking malware such as ZeuS and SpyEye might expect to be held liable for those 
losses (Marcus & Sherstobitoff, 2012). 
Brand (2007) reveals that malware can integrate numerous techniques to avoid forensic detection and forensic 
analysis as well. This technique is known as anti-forensic. Primary goals for anti-forensic is leaving no evidence, 
avoiding detection, disrupting the collection of information and casting doubt on a forensic report (Garfinkel, 
2007).  These researches have the same message to digital forensic community: the challenge for collecting the 
digital evidence in regards with legal consideration. 
With the challenge from Trojan banking malwares and the shortcomings on post-mortem forensics and live 
response, then the question is the proper approach that available for the examiners for collecting the digital 
evidence on Trojan banking malware incidents. This paper demonstrates how the live response, memory forensic 
and Windows registry forensics as a representation of post-mortem forensics find the digital evidence on Trojan 
banking malware incidents.  The results will show whether the live response and Windows registry analysis are 
still the viable options for the examiner on Trojan banking malware incidents. This work also demonstrates 
network forensics as a conjunction process to obtain more robust and thorough evidence. 
This paper uses three different Trojan banking malware samples: Cridex, ZeuS and SpyEye as the object of 
analysis.  The reason for analysing different samples is to acquire the pattern of the malwares and the reason for 
choosing the malware sample is based on the popularity and the financial impacts on a global scale.  This work is 
far from exhaustive, and serves merely as an introduction to the techniques employed to live response, memory 
forensics, Windows registry analysis, network forensics and malware analysis of Trojan banking malwares. 
This work uses active approach by executing the malware samples on controlled environment. For this paper, 
legal issue surrounding the behavioural analysis of the malware samples is ignored.  It is presumed the malicious 
software that is being examined is the intellectual property of the organization that will has authorised this 
activity.  Cridex, Zeus and SpyEye as samples on this paper have many different variants. Therefore the results 
from analysis on this paper works only for the variants that have been used.  The different variants from the same 
malware sample might show a different result. 
RELATED WORKS 
IOActive (2012) performed a reversal and analysis of the Trojans banking such as SpyEye and ZeuS .  The study 
reveals that SpyEye incorporated many advanced tricks try to hide its presence on the local system. The bot's 
advanced hooking and injection mechanisms as well as its core functionality used to hijack and steal user 
information.  On the other hand, ZeuS has been identified has additional roadblocks including non-existent 
import address tables, obfuscated string tables, and relocated code. ZeuS included many methods to hinder 
reverse engineering. 
According to Ståhlberg (2008), the Mstrings approach to Trojan banking analysis and detection seem feasible for 
the moment. Most current Trojan banking can be detected solely because they include filter strings. Especially if 
the analysis system has access to the internet, this approach can be used to analyse incoming malware samples. 
An alert can be sent to targeted banks and this can be done automatically. 
On his study of SilentBanker, Theerthagiri (2009) reveals that organizations should think about creating 
signatures for preventing information leaks and also block all possible sites and IP addresses that host exploits or 
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drop site of Trojans.  Attackers can modify the present code of the Trojan banking and strive to keep their exploit 
server active. In his study, Dolan-Gavitt (2008) found that it is possible for an attacker with the ability to modify 
kernel memory to alter the cached registry data in memory, and thus alter the behavior of the operating system, 
without the changes being visible in the on-disk storage. In the same paper, Dollan-Gavitt also noted that an 
average of 631 keys and 1231 values per image were volatile and would not have been found using methods that 
only examine the hives on disk.   
Malware researchers show techniques to escape memory analysis using a low-level rootkit (Sparks & Butler, 
2005) and that certain virtualization-based rootkits may be hard to detect (Chen & Samuel, 2006).  On the other 
hand, memory forensics researchers show how memory forensics tools such as Volatility could be used for 
analyzing the Trojan banking malwares for finding the evidence (DiMino, 2012; Malwareninja, 2011). 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TROJAN BANKING MALWARES 
The detail information of malware samples that have been used on this paper is described on Appendices 1. 
Additionally, there are six characters of Trojan banking malwares that have been applied as the targets for 
achieving the objective of this work (OWASP, 2012).  Every forensics approach should be worked to find the 
evidence based on the characteristic. The procedures and tools for acquiring the digital evidence are documented 
on Appendices 2. 
 
Table 1: Characterization and targets of digital evidence 
No Digital Evidence to Find Characterization 
1 Installation by finding the Worms 
Copy on the Virtual Machine. 
All the Trojan banking malwares are known to have copy of the 
worms after it was running or execute on the victim’s machine.  
Therefore, the first footprint that indicated the existence of such 
malware is the worms copy on the victim’s machine. 
2 Payload (Processes) After creating the worms copy on the victim’s machine, the 
malware will running its payload through certain services or 
processes on the victim’s machine. There are several researches 
or works that shows the possibility of such Trojan banking 
malwares use the anti-forensic techniques to hide its existence or 
function. The techniques ware used to avoid detection from anti-
virus and forensic application, especially on Live Response 
approach. 
3 Network Connections One of the main purposes of the payload or processes is to create 
a connection to the Command and Control (C&C) Server.   
4 Mutant or Mutex (mutual 
exclusion) Objects  
Malwares often uses mutex objects for the same purpose as 
legitimate software and to avoid re-infecting the host. Therefore, 
mutex object is one of persistent signature on the victim’s 
machine. 
5 The important information on the 
particular processes  
Trojan banking malwares has documented its target such as 
particular financial organization, name and IP Addresses of the 
C&C Server on the particular processes.  This information could 
be obtained by dumping the services and make output strings 
from it. 
6 Firewall Policy To avoid its existence, the Trojan banking malwares change the 
firewall policy on the Operating System. 
 
RESULTS 
Installation by finding the worms copy on the virtual machine 
 
Live response approach finds the evidence for the installation on the three malware samples. The evidence shows 
that Cridex has the worm copy with name of the file: kb00374800.exe. This worm execution file has found by 
Autoruns and WinAudit.  On Zeus with the name of worm copy: ntos.exe.  This worm execution file has found 
by Autoruns, Handle, Rootkit Revealer and WinAudit. On SpyEye with the name of worm copy: 
cleansweep.exe.  This worm execution file found by Rootkit Revealer.  Memory forensics approach with 
Volatility finds the existence of worm copy of Cridex on the virtual machine with command: printkey -K 
"Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run". For Zeus, Volatility finds the existence of worms copy 
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with command: -o 0xe17fea40 -K "Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon".  Windows Registry 
approach with Registry Viewer finds the evidence on Cridex and SpyEye on registry path: 
NTUSER.DAT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. For Zeus, Registry Viewer finds the 
existence of worms copy on Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.  This results show 
that all approaches could find the evidence of Installation process on the three malware samples. 
Payload (Processes) 
Live Response approach through Process Explorer records all the suspicious processes on the three malwares 
samples. Memory Forensic approach also shows the records of all the suspicious processes or payloads on the 
three malware samples.  Windows Registry approach could not deliver the evidence of payloads on the three 
malware samples. 
  
Network connections  
The result for live response approach is documented on the Network-based evidence. Memory forensic approach 
with Volatility finds several findings:  On ZeuS, there is one connection suspected with C&C Server with IP 
Address 195.2.253.194.  This connection was created by the payload (svchost.exe/PID 864). On SpyEye, there is 
a connection that suspected with C&C Server with IP Address 188.40.138.148.  This connection was created by 
the payload (cleansweep.exe/PID1456). On the Cridex, there is no significant connection that could be identified 
as a suspicious connection with C&C Server. But according with (DiMino, 2012), his work for analyzing the 
Cridex shows that there is a connection with the indicated C&C Server. On the other hand, Windows Registry 
approach could not find the evidence for the connections with C&C Server. 
Mutant or mutex (mutual exclusion) objects 
There is no mutex objects found by live response approach. Memory Forensic forensics finds 114 mutex objects 
on Cridex, 125 mutex objects on Zeus and 96 mutex objects on SpyEye. After analyzing all the mutex objects 
from the three malwares, there are similar 59 mutex object found on all the malwares.  It is indicated that those 
mutex object has been used for avoiding the multiple infections by the three malware samples on the same 
machine.  
The important information on the particular processes 
Live response approach could not find the important and relevant strings on the dumping processes.  Memory 
forensics approach could found the important information by dumping the certain processes and create the output 
strings from it. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 1164) on Cridex shows the name of DNS that indicated 
work as a C&C Servers. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 864) on Zeus shows the IP Address of C&C 
Servers. The suspicious payload (svchost.exe/PID 1084) on SpyEye shows the name of DNS that indicated work 
as a C&C Servers. Windows Registry approach could not find the evidence in terms of important information on 
the registry files. 
Firewall policy 
Live response approach through WinAudit reports that the Firewall is disabled on Zeus incident. Memory 
Forensic approach also finds the same evidence that Firewall is disabled by Zeus.  The command to find the 
perimeter of the Firewall Policy on the memory: -K 
"ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile". Based on the Regshot 
results, Cridex changes the Firewall Policy on the Registry by opening Port 1900, 2869, 139, 445, 137 and 138. 
After examining with Registry Viewer on one of File Registry: SYSTEM, then the finding supports the Regshot 
result. For Zeus, Registry Viewer finds the Firewall Policy on: SYSTEM \CurrentControlSet 
\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile with value:”0” (disable). 
NETWORK-BASED EVIDENCE 
Trojan malwares are highly dependent of the network for propagation, control and payload functionality.  
Therefore, network forensics is play important role on finding the network-based evidence beside the host-based 
forensics approach such as post-mortem, live response, and memory analysis.  As part of triangulation on 
obtaining and analyzing the digital evidence, this works documented the network forensics approach on the three 
malware samples. 
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Netstat Command 
This paper uses comparison of Protocol Connections and TCP/IP network connections on condition before and 
after running the malware with Netstat command (netstat –ano). TCPView and Port Explorer use in conjunction 
with the Netstat’s comparison to acquire thorough analysis.  This comparison and records/log from TCPView 
and Port Explorer give the summary of the results below: 
 
Table 2: Result of Netstat command, TCPView and Port Explorer 
Malware New Active Connections After Running the Malware TCPView and Port 
Explorer 
Cridex  Proto     Local Address  Foreign Address  State                PID 
 
 UDP       0.0.0.0:64625                  *:*                              1164 
 
- There is no record or log 
on TCPView regarding 
with the PID 1164 and its 
relation with TCP/UDP 
Connections. 
- The Port Explorer shown 
the same result with 
TCPView. 
ZeuS  Proto     Local Address  Foreign Address  State                   PID 
 
TCP    0.0.0.0:12642     0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING      864 
TCP    0.0.0.0:26994     0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING      864  
TCP    0.0.0.0:38606     0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING      864 
 
- There is complete record 
or log on TCPView 
regarding with the PID 
864 with 3 TCP 
Connections and its port 
number. 
- The Port Explorer shown 
the same result with 
TCPView. 
SpyEye Proto     Local Address  Foreign Address  State                   PID 
 
UDP    0.0.0.0:55144          *:*                                           1084 
- There is no record or log 
on TCPView regarding 
with the PID 1084 and its 
relation with TCP/UDP 
Connections. 
- The Port Explorer shown 
the same result with 
TCPView. 
 
The new active or changing of TCP/IP connection(s) leads to other analysis.  The process explorer gives specific 
information regarding with the specific process/PID.  This analysis process is important for finding the 
payload(s), since Trojan banking malware has known to use API hooking technique to execute its payload.  The 
summary of Process Explorer shown below: 
Table 3: Result of Process Explorer 
No Process PID CPU Private Bytes Working Set
 Description Company Name 
Description 
Cridex winlogon.exe 624
          
    svchost.exe 1164
   
 
6,564 K 356 K Windows NT Logon 
Application Microsoft Corporation  
1,436 K 88 K Generic Host Process for 
Win32 Services Microsoft Corporation 
Parent Process ID 
ZeuS  winlogon.exe 628
   
    svchost.exe 864
   
6,804 K 696 K Windows NT Logon 
Application Microsoft Corporation  
6,832 K 2,116 K Generic Host Process for 
Win32 Services Microsoft Corporation 
Parent Process ID 
SpyEye winlogon.exe 628 
 
     svchost.exe 1084
   
7,188 K 5,296 K Windows NT Logon 
Application Microsoft Corporation 
1,640 K 4,104 K Generic Host Process for 
Win32 Services Microsoft Corporation  
Parent Process ID 
It reveals that all the malwares install themselves into Winlogon.exe. The purpose is to make sure the payload 
will be started every time when the Windows OS boots up and from here it will spread to every single process. 
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Dump the Process and Strings Output 
The results from previous analysis could be used as the base of dumping the particular process.  Then the analyst 
could perform an analysis of the Strings Output from it. From the strings output, the analyst might find important 
and interesting strings which could be used as the evidence.  The example of strings output from memory dump 
of particular process is shown on Appendices 3. 
These strings output shows that each malware samples using a different method for stealing the credentials. The 
strings output from ZeuS reveals the specified IP Address. This information is important for finding the C&C 
server or who might be responsible for the actions of malware.  
Network Packet Capture 
Wireshark has been used for examining network traffic for evidence of unusual or malicious traffic on the virtual 
machine.  Using Wireshark to capture traffic to and from a suspect host is an example of reactive analysis 
(Chappell, 2010).   
The network traffics on Cridex and SpyEye show the DNS Protocol packets. This indicates that the payload of 
Cridex and SpyEye communicates via SSL with a remote server for command and control of the malware. The 
Cridex was observed to connect with 4 of the following domains for this purpose such as evenconc.ru, extorld.ru, 
imbingdo.ru and shushev.ru. Almost all the packets or frames were contained with only two protocols: Domain 
Name Service (DNS) and NetBIOS Name Service. SpyEye was observed creating a connection with 
horizontalspy.domain.lc with IP Address 188.40.138.148. It is indicating that the domain server works as a C&C 
Server. Following the TCP Stream for the packets based on the IP Address shows two interesting results: 
 
POST http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitechk.php HTTP/1.1 
Host: horizonspy.domain.lc 
Connection: close 
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=55377776816118 
Content-Length: 667 
 
(skipped) 
 
GET 
/main/bt_version_checker.php?guid=COMPUTER!VM_TROJAN!18C21DD0&ver=10070&stat=ONLINE&ie=
8.0.6001.18702&os=5.1.2600&ut=Admin&cpu=12&ccrc=0181AD0B HTTP/1.1 
User-Agent: Microsoft Internet Explorer 
Host: horizonspy.domain.lc 
HTTP/1.1 302 Found 
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2012 07:18:15 GMT 
Server: Apache/2.2.9 
Location: 
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/?guid=COMPUTER!VM_TROJAN!18C21DD0&ver=10070&stat=ONLINE&ie=8.
0.6001.18702&os=5.1.2600&ut=Admin&cpu=12&ccrc=0181AD0B 
 
(skipped) 
 
The stream content above is supporting the finding from the strings output from svchost.exe (PID 1084). It is 
found that the payload create a connection with the C&C Server and perform certain method GET and POST in 
HTML forms command into the specified URL in order to steal the credential’s online banking users. 
The packet captures from ZeuS shows interesting results.  There is a connection and network packets transferred 
between virtual machine and IP Address 195.2.253.194 that hosted by spheral.ru.  The condition is aligning with 
the strings output from svchost.exe (PID 864). The strings output documented two specified IP Address: 
195.2.253.194 and 64.59.140.93. These IP Addresses were indicated work as the C&C server.  Analysis results 
from Wireshark shows the statistical condition for TCP Endpoints from these connections. There are 17 ports 
were open to transfer and receive the packets. One port is rootd or port 1094. The rootd daemon works with 
the TNetFile class. It allows remote access to root database files in either read or read/write mode.  
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DISCUSSION 
The procedures on live-response, memory forensics and Windows Registry approaches for acquiring the digital 
evidence on the three different Trojan banking malware incidents shows the significant results. Live-response 
and Windows Registry approaches could find the digital evidence, however there is the possibility of anti-
forensics techniques on the malware samples that might compromise the results.  All the approaches could 
identify and obtain the evidence of installation or worm copy on the infected machines.  The same result also 
founds to identify the Firewall Policy that might have been changed by the malwares on the infected machines.  
On the other hand, memory forensics approach shows the advancement of its technique to find all the target 
evidence. 
Group (2002) reveals every examiner should obtained from the volatile to the less volatile when collecting 
evidence on incident response.  This statement aligned with this work. Almost all the evidence on Trojan 
banking malware incidents were resided on the physical memory. Therefore, the examiner should avoid 
performing post-mortem forensics approach on such incidents before they collect and/or analyze the volatile 
memory. 
Walters and Petroni (2007) documented a set of drawbacks on live-response approach when it wants to be used 
on the incident response.  One drawback is live-response might disturbs the state of machine under investigation. 
This condition is inevitable, since the examiner should run a several Windows API applications to obtain the 
evidence on the infected machines. Even though the examiner could find the valid and relevant evidence by this 
technique, but considering the possibility of the disturbance on the victim’s machine then it is obvious to use 
proper forensics approach on Trojan banking malware incidents. If the examiner still insists to perform live 
response approach, and then it has been advised to perform it after dumping the physical memory. 
Network forensics approach shows how to identify the presence of the malware on the network and obtain 
network-based evidence as a conjunction with host-based evidence. The netstat command as the initial analysis 
shows the indicated malicious processes or known as payloads. On the other hand, other tools could not detect 
such processes. On the next process, the examiner could dump the processes and make strings output from it.  
Moreover, this work shows the importance of the strings. It might contain all relevant and valid information due 
to the payload functionality and C&C server connections from each malware samples. These finding supports 
the research by Stahlberg (2007) that most of current Trojan banking could be detected solely based on the filter 
strings.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has demonstrated and discussed the procedures and findings on live-response, memory forensics and 
Windows Registry forensics approaches. The results might show the proper forensics approach on Trojan 
banking malware incident for digital forensic examiner with regard to legal requirement on digital evidence.  
Despite of the approaches, every examiner should prioritize the collection of volatile memory on Trojan banking 
malware incidents. Memory forensics approach shows the thorough and robust findings with minimal 
disturbance on the machine. The examiner only needs to dump the physical memory on the first occasion of 
incidents without running many applications such as Windows API tools on live-response. This approach also 
offering repeatability and reproducibility factors that might fulfill legal requirement on digital evidence. 
This paper also shows the importance of network forensics on Trojan banking malware incidents. Since the 
Trojan malwares are highly dependent on the network for propagation, control and payload functionality, then 
examiner might consider collecting the network-based evidence beside the host-based evidence.  Both 
procedures could be performed as a conjunction to acquire more robust and thorough digital evidence.  
Moreover, the organization could use the network-based evidence such as the strings, suspicious IP Address, and 
malicious packets to prevent such incidents on the future by adding this information on Intrusion Prevention 
System/Intrusion Detection System. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendices 1: Detail information and source of malware samples 
 
Table 4: Detail information and source of malware samples 
No Malware Sample Source 
1 Cridex Trojan Banking 
 
MD5:  e92de5cc06a361575d24adbde4bf0e81 
SHA1:  29fc820e7e989f961cf7eab24a4f553488a60307 
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
earch=cridex 
2 ZeuS  Trojan Banking 
 
MD5:  fb4d991644686160625eafe0c589392b 
SHA1:  
944810e76932d83e338d25711175fc66903c8c0a 
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
earch=zeus 
3 SpyEye Trojan Banking 
 
MD5:  79ac48be8de57d54764fdd22c0fe3f16 
SHA1:  38f0f5d3849e78a1e0fb6f83e9fedf8f45d1cffb 
http://oc.gtisc.gatech.edu:8080/search.cgi?s
earch=spyeye 
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Appendices 2: Tools and Procedures  
 
Table 5: Tools and procedures on live response approach 
o Tools Procedures 
1 Running several applications: 
a. Process Explorer v15.23,  
b. Autoruns for Windows v11.34,  
c. Handle v3.5 
 
Autoruns 
1. Autoruns Options: 
- Hide Microsoft and Windows Entries; 
- Verify code signatures. 
2. Save the output scan for comparison process. 
Process Explorer: 
1. Paused by pressing the space bar 
Handle: 
Run and save the result 
2 Running the Malware  
3 a. Handle v.3.5 
b. Autoruns; 
c. Process Explorer. 
1) Run Handle and save the result. 
2) Refresh Autoruns and Process Explorer. 
4 a. Autoruns; 
b. Process Explorer’s  
 
1) Run compare function on Autoruns and save the result; 
2) Check the suspicious program on Autoruns for its processes 
on Process Explorer; 
3) Save the Process Explorer’s capturing process; 
4) Check for any suspicious highlighted process on Process 
Explorer and records/save the results. 
5) Check the digital signature with Process Explorer for any 
suspicious processes and records/save the results; 
6) Dump the suspicious processes and save the strings with 
Process Explorer. 
5 - VMMap  
 
1) Run the VMMap against the suspicious processes 
2) Use VMMap’s strings dialog for any suspicious processes. 
3) Save the results; 
6 WinAudit Freeware v.2.29 Run WinAudit and save the result. 
7 RootkitRevealer v1.71 Scan for any presence of the rootkit on virtual machine. 
8 Analysis Analyse all the results from the tools above. 
 
Table 6: Tools and procedures on memory forensics approach 
No Tools Procedures 
1 VMware Player with Windows XP 
SP3x86 as the Operating System 
Suspend the virtual machine and copy the vmem for analysis 
process. 
2 Volatility ver. 2.2 Analyse with Volatility ver. 2.2 
 
Table 7: Tools and procedures on windows registry forensics approach 
No Tools Procedures 
1 VMware Player with Windows XP 
SP3x86 as the Operating System 
Shutdown and booting the virtual machine 
2 FTK Imager Acquire the Windows Registry with FTK Imager 
3 Registry Viewer Analyse the Windows Registry with Registry Viewer 
 
Table 8: Tools and procedures on network forensics approach 
No Tools Procedures 
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1 Running several applications: 
a) Regshot v.1.8.3; 
b) TCPView v.2.54 
c) Port Explorer 
d) Wireshark both on Guest and 
Host 
e) Netstat on Operating System; 
 
Regshot: 
Capture 1st conditions 
 
Netstat-ano: 
Run Netstat –ano from command prompt and Save on notepad. 
 
Wireshark: 
Capture the packet 
2 Running the Malware  
3 f) Wireshark 
g) Netstat 
h) Regshot:  
a) Wireshark: capture the packet; 
b) Run Netstat –ano from command prompt and save on 
notepad. 
c. Reghsot: capture 2nd condition and run compare function 
and save the result;  
4 Analysis Analyse all the results from the tools above. 
 
 
Appendices 3: Example of Strings Output Results  
 
TABLE 9: EXAMPLE OF STRINGS OUTPUT RESULTS 
Malwares Example Strings Output 
Cridex svchost.exe.2486c10.0x00630000-0x0066ffff.dmp: shushev.ru 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x00630000-0x0066ffff.dmp: shushev.ru.localdomain 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: Logging information for DNS Caching 
Resolver service 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: System Time Information 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: DNS Caching Resolver service 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: d:\nt\ds\dns\resolver\server\remote.c 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76770000-0x7677cfff.dmp: d:\nt\ds\dns\resolver\server\rpc.c 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: www.microsoft.com 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: microsoft.com 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: update.microsoft.com 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: download.microsoft.com 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: microsoftupdate.com 
svchost.exe.2486c10.0x76f20000-0x76f46fff.dmp: windowsupdate.com 
ZeuS  svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: 
Ahttps://onlineeast#.bankofamerica.com/cgi-bin/ias/*/GotoWelcome 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Password: %s 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Type: %s 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Version: %S 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Balance: 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: 
C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\systemprofile\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\ 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Ahttps://www.e-
gold.com/sci_asp/payments.asp 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: A*PAYMENT_AMOUNT= 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: APAYEE_ACCOUNT=*& 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: APAYEE_ACCOUNT=%u& 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: Application/x-internet-signup 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ://195.2.253.194/lsd/tt.bin 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: /lsd/tt.bin HTTP/1.1 
svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ://195.2.253.194/lsd/tt.bin 
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svchost.exe.23d7da0.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: http://64.59.140.93/wpad.dat 
SpyEye svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x00090000-0x0018ffff.dmp: ost.exe 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: _AVIRA_ 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: __SYSTEM__ 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *call*event* 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: call_event 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: onclick 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: target 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: American Express 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Visa 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: MasterCard 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Discover 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Smth wrong with navigate to BILLING-
PAGE. 0_o 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *We are sending* 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: *Thank You For Your Order* 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: core-section-header 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_exp_year 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find Month stuff on second page. 
0_o 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_exp_month 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find CSC stuff on second page. 
0_o 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_security_code 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: Cannot find CardNumber stuff on second 
page. 0_o 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: confirm:card_number 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: http://www.microsoft.com 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: horizonspy.domain.lc 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: 
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitechk.php 
svchost.exe.2225ca8.0x0ea50000-0x0ea78fff.dmp: 
http://horizonspy.domain.lc/formgrabber/websitecheck.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
